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INFLATION TARGETING AND THE
NATURAL RATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT
willem thorbecke
Inflation targeting has become an increasingly popular strategy for setting mon-
etary policy during the last decade. While no countries had formal inflation tar-
gets before 1990, currently 22 countries use inflation targeting. One notable
exception is the United States, where the Federal Reserve has a dual mandate to
pursue both price stability and full employment. Some economists advocate
inflation targeting for the United States, partly because they fear that otherwise
the Fed will try to push unemployment below its “natural rate”—its lowest
sustainable level—and trigger accelerating inflation. However, the natural rate
theory has proven to be a poor guide for policy making over the last 10 years.
Unemployment in 2000 fell 2 percentage points below estimates of the natural
rate without spurring inflation. Since inflation targeting derives its justification
largely from the theory of the natural rate, it is questionable whether the United
States should switch to an inflation-targeting regime.These doubts are reinforced
by the manifest success of monetary policy under the dual mandate.
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gets or target ranges for inflation and acknowledging that
curbing inflation is the primary and overriding long-run goal
of monetary policy (Bernanke et al. 1999). Ben S. Bernanke, a
member of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, has also
proposed that the Fed announce its optimal long-run inflation
rate (OLIR) as “an incremental move toward inflation target-
ing”(2003).
Bernanke’s work makes clear that the case for inflation tar-
geting and the OLIR rests on the natural rate hypothesis
(Bernanke et al. 1999; Bernanke 2003). This hypothesis was
developed by Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1970) as a response
to the Phillips curve.
The Phillips curve holds that the rate of growth of wages or
prices depends inversely on the excess supply of labor in the
economy. If the excess supply of labor (measured, for example,
by the unemployment rate) falls, the growth rate of nominal
wages (hourly earnings in dollars) will increase. As Tobin dis-
cussed (1980), the Phillips curve is built on the idea that wages
are somewhat rigid in large parts of the economy,where they are
set by negotiations or administrative decisions. Because wages
adjust slowly, the labor market fails to reach a point where the
number of jobs available equals the number of people willing to
work at the going wage. Instead, it is typically characterized by
excess supply of labor, or unemployment. An increase in the
demand for labor, by improving the bargaining position of
unions and individual workers, produces higher wages at the
same time that it reduces unemployment. As firms pass on the
higher labor costs in the form of higher prices, an inverse rela-
tionship arises between inflation and unemployment.
Friedman (1968), in advancing the natural rate theory,
argued that there was a logical flaw to Phillips curve models.
The models implied that higher inflation could produce per-
manently higher levels of output and employment. Instead,
according to Friedman, any inflation-unemployment trade-
off would be temporary. Such a trade-off would occur, for
instance, if expansionary monetary policy increased the price
of goods and services before it increased the price of labor. As
firms received more for what they produced and paid the same
for their labor input, their profits would increase. This would
cause them to increase employment and output. However, as
workers realized that inflation had increased, they would
demand higher wages in compensation. As wages increased 
by the same amount as prices, firms’ profits and thus their
employment and output would return to their pre-expansionary
levels. Inflation, however, would be higher.
Friedman argued that there was a natural, market-
determined rate of unemployment. He claimed that expan-
sionary monetary policy would cause unemployment to fall
below this natural rate temporarily, and inflation to increase
above its pre-expansion level permanently. Any attempt to use
monetary policy to keep unemployment below the natural rate
would produce accelerating inflation.
The natural rate theory predicted events well in the late
1960s and early 1970s. Policymakers in the 1960s pursued
overly expansionary policies. President Johnson, for instance,
argued that the U.S. could have both “guns and butter” and
increased spending for the Vietnam War without raising taxes.
From 1961 to 1969 unemployment fell and inflation rose along
a stable Phillips curve. After that, inflation accelerated and the
stable Phillips curve disappeared, as forecast by the natural 
rate theory.
However, both the natural rate theory and the Phillips
curve predicted poorly in the 1990s. The large majority of
economists predicted that inflation would pick up as unem-
ployment fell below estimates of the natural rate (or nonaccel-
erating inflation rate of unemployment, NAIRU). Martin
Feldstein argued in 1995 that unemployment had fallen far
below the NAIRU and said he was sure that steadily rising infla-
tion would follow.
1 Robert Gordon told the Fed in December
1994 that unemployment below 6 or maybe even 6.5 percent
would trigger accelerating inflation.
2
Edmund Phelps stated in
1996 that the unemployment rate of 5.5 percent would cause
inflation to heat up within five months.
3 Frederic Mishkin
argued that businesspeople made the same mistake over and
over again in assuming that unemployment in the range of 5.5
percent would not cause inflation to increase significantly.
4 The
Economic Report of the President (1996) and Paul Krugman
reported estimates of the NAIRU between 5.5 and 6 percent,
implying that inflation would pick up as unemployment fell
below that range.
5
In reality, unemployment fell to 3.8 percent
with inflation never reaching 3 percent.
Falling unemployment was thus not accompanied by rising
inflation in the last decade, a development that runs counter to
the experience of the 1960s. Part of the reason for this lies in
changes to the structure of the U.S. economy. These changes
include a decrease in the bargaining power of workers,a decrease
in the pricing power of firms, and an increase in productivity
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reduced the natural rate of unemployment.
One reason falling unemployment triggered little inflation
over the past 10 years is that so many of the unemployed were
low-skilled workers who lacked bargaining power.For instance,
in 2000, less than 10 percent of the unemployed had college
diplomas.
6 Blanchard and Katz (1997) stated, “At the bottom
end of the skill distribution, workers have little or no bargain-
i n g  p o w e r .... ”I n s t e a d ,t h e y  c o n t i n u e d ,s u c h  p e o ple work pre-
dominantly in the competitive sector of the labor market (i.e.,
in jobs whose wages are set by supply and demand). These
workers’ wages thus reflect their output per hour worked (i.e.,
their productivity).Therefore,as unemployment falls and low-
skilled workers find jobs, they will not have the bargaining
power necessary to push for wage increases in excess of pro-
ductivity growth. As long as their pay raises reflect increased
output, firms’ unit labor costs (i.e., the labor costs of produc-
ing one unit of output) will not increase. Thus firms will not
need to raise prices to cover higher labor costs.
In the 1960s, on the other hand, a greater percentage of
low-skilled workers had bargaining power because they were
unionized or working in sectors where they could not be
quickly replaced (e.g.,the manufacturing sector).Thus,as unem-
ployment fell, they were more able than their counterparts in
the last decade to bid up nominal wages relative to productiv-
ity. This, in turn, increased unit labor costs and often forced
firms to raise prices.
A second reason inflation did not increase over the last 10
years has to do with the ability of firms to raise prices.In recent
years both international competition (e.g., from China) and
domestic competition (e.g., from stores like Wal-Mart) have
limited the ability of firms to raise prices. Even if wages do
increase, firms are often compelled to reduce profit margins
rather than raise prices. Speaking of this, longtime General
Electric CEO Jack Welch said,“There is no inflation....T h e r e
is no pricing power at all”(Stevenson 1996).
A third reason inflation did not pick up over the last
decade is a surge in productivity. Advances in information-
and-communications technology have increased labor produc-
tivity and reduced unit labor costs. These efficiency gains have
allowed firms to increase output and employment while keep-
ing prices down.
A fourth possible explanation that falling unemployment
did not trigger inflation is that increases in aggregate demand
may have reduced the natural rate.This reduction would happen
if the resulting stronger labor market allowed workers to acquire
job skills or job-search skills or if it led to a long-lasting improve-
ment in people’s motivation to seek work. Fed Chairman Alan
Greenspan (1997a; 1997b) argued that the “expansion has
enabled many in the working-age population,a large number of
whom would have remained out of the labor force or among the
longer-term unemployed, to acquire work experience and
improved skills.”Rivlin (1999) discussed how providing workers
with training in the use of new equipment and techniques
helped raise productivity.In the past,conventional wisdom held
that allowing unemployment to fall and employing lower-skilled
workers would reduce productivity, increase unit labor costs,
and thus trigger inflation (Coy 1997; Nasar and Mitchell 1999).
Experience in recent years suggests that unskilled workers can be
trained on the job, allowing their productivity to increase. This
enhancement of job skills,in turn,permits unemployment to fall
without reducing productivity or producing inflation.
These changes in the structure of the economy imply that
stimulative monetary policy will be less inflationary and con-
tractionary policy less potent in quelling inflation. At low lev-
els of unemployment, the unemployed are primarily unskilled
workers. In previous work, I presented evidence that monetary
policy has a much greater impact on unskilled workers than on
skilled workers (Thorbecke 1997; 2001). Thus expansionary
monetary policy at low levels of unemployment will largely
reduce unemployment among unskilled workers,who have less
ability to push for wage increases in excess of productivity
growth. Furthermore, even if they did receive such increases, it
is unclear that firms would be able to pass on these higher labor
costs in the form of higher prices. Similarly, contractionary
monetary policy would initially increase unemployment pri-
marily among low-skilled workers. Since these workers are
mainly in the competitive sector of the labor market, increased
unemployment would elicit only small reductions in wages rel-
ative to productivity. Large swings in unemployment might be
necessary, therefore, to produce changes in inflation.
If the Fed were to adopt inflation targeting,more volatility
in unemployment would result. Low-skilled workers, minori-
ties, single mothers, and other groups disproportionately rep-
resented among the unemployed would pay a high price for the
Fed’s attempts to focus on inflation.
It could be argued that announcing an optimal long-run
inflation rate might not put more weight on an inflation target,
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However, the Fed’s announcement of an estimate for the OLIR
but not for the NAIRU would cause policymakers to attach
more weight to keeping inflation close to the OLIR. Imagine a
dean at a university telling a professor that the university is
concerned about both research and service to the university,
but will only measure performance based on research. In that
case, professors would tend to neglect service. Similarly, if the
Fed announces a long-run target for inflation but not for the
NAIRU, there will be a tendency for policymakers to put
greater weight than they do now on hitting that target in the
long run at the expense of volatility in unemployment.
The Federal Reserve could,of course,announce a target for
the NAIRU also. However, given the massive errors in forecast-
ing the NAIRU in the 1990s and the huge degree of uncertainty
surrounding NAIRU estimates (Staiger et al. 1997),any targeted
NAIRU would be an imprecise estimate of the true NAIRU.
The same would probably be true for the OLIR. It is hard
to measure directly the benefits of low inflation (e.g., Barro
[1995] reported that reducing inflation by one percentage
point would increase economic growth by between 0.02 and
0.03 of a percentage point). Any measure of the OLIR would
thus be indirect and imprecise.The great statistician and physi-
cist Norbert Weiner said that economics is a one- or two-digit
science (Staiger et al. 1997). Asking whether the NAIRU is 4.5
or 5.5 or 6.5 is not enlightening (ibid.). Similarly, it is probably
true that we cannot know whether the OLIR is 1.8 or 2.2 or 2.5.
If we communicate to the public a specific number for the OLIR,
it will take on a palpable reality that it probably does not deserve.
The Fed will thus create volatility in unemployment, especially
among low-skilled workers,trying to hit an inflation target that
is somewhat arbitrary.
Inflation and deflation are dangers,but not the danger.The
Fed needs to be vigilant about these. However, unemployment
is also a scourge, both for the individuals who are out of work
and for society. Recent experience with falling unemployment
suggests that slack in labor markets too should be a focus for
policymakers. Falling unemployment does not lead automati-
cally to rising inflation; indeed, long-lasting gains for low-
skilled workers might ensue if workers become more productive
as they are trained on the job.
Over the last 10 years, core inflation has averaged 2.4 per-
cent and fluctuated between 1.1 and 3.1 percent, and unem-
ployment has averaged 5.1 percent and fluctuated between 3.8
and 6.6 percent. Macroeconomic performance under the Fed’s
dual mandate has thus been splendid.Rather than switching to
a new paradigm for monetary policy based on inflation target-
ing and the OLIR, it seems appropriate to try to extract and
distill lessons from monetary policy making under the current
modus operandi.
Notes
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